Introduction
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (hereafter VCG) for private values environments is a classic example of a mechanism for which truthful revelation is ex post incentive compatible. It is well-known, however, that truthful revelation is generally no longer incentive compatible when we move from a private values environment to an interdependent values environment. In McLean and Postlewaite (2014) (henceforth MP (2014)) we showed that, when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) , there exists a modi…cation of a generalized VCG mechanism using small additional transfers that restores incentive compatibility. This paper presents an alternative, two-stage, mechanism that accomplishes the same goal -restoring incentive compatibility for interdependent value problems. The advantage of the two stage mechanism relative to a single stage mechanism is that, for typical problems, agents need to transmit substantially less information.
We will explain intuitively the nature of the savings in transmitted information. Consider a problem in which there is uncertainty about the state of nature. An agent's private information consists of a state dependent payo¤ function and a signal correlated with the state. A single stage mechanism that delivers an e¢ cient outcome for any realization of agents' types must do two things. First, it must elicit the information agents have about the state of nature to determine the posterior probability distribution given that information. Second, it must elicit agents'privately known state dependent payo¤s. A two stage mechanism can separate the two tasks. First, elicit the information about the state of nature, but relay to agents the posterior distribution on the state of nature before collecting any additional information. When agents are induced to reveal their information about the state of nature truthfully, relaying the posterior distribution on the state of nature converts the interdependent value problem into a private value problem. When agents know the probability distribution on the set of states of nature, they need only report their expected utility for each possible social outcome rather than their utility for every social outcome in each of the states. Essentially, by moving from a one stage mechanism to a two stage mechanism, we can shift the job of computing expected utilities given the posterior from the mechanism to the agents. Doing this reduces the information that agents must report to the mechanism; we discuss this in the last section.
In this paper, we construct a two stage game in which the second stage is modeled as a standard private values VCG mechanism. The basic mechanics of …rst eliciting the information correlated with the state of nature in order to convert an interdependent values problem into private values problem can be applied to certain other environments as well. In particular, our …rst stage can be combined with certain other mechanisms with desirable properties in private value problems to address implementation problems in the presence of interdependent values.
We provide an example of how our mechanism works in the next section, and present the general mechanism after that.
Example
The following single object auction example, a modi…cation of the example in McLean and Postlewaite (2004) , illustrates our basic idea. An object is to be sold to one of three agents. There are two equally likely states of the world, 1 and 2 , and an agent's value for the object depends on the state of the world. Agent i's state dependent utility function can written as v i = (v Consequently, an agent's private information, his type, is a pair (s i ; v i ) and we make two assumptions. First, for any type pro…le (s i ; v i )
; the conditional distribution on the state space given (s i ; v i ) 3 i=1 depends only on the signals (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ): Therefore, the agents'utility functions provide no information relevant for predicting the state that is not already contained in the signal pro…le alone. Second, we assume that for any type (s i ; v i ) of agent i, the conditional distribution on the signals s i of the other two agents given (s i ; v i ) depends only on i's signal s i : Note that the conditional distribution on the state space given (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) and the conditional distribution on the signals s i given s i can be computed using the table above.
Suppose the objective is to allocate the object to the agent for whom the expected value, conditional on the agents'true signal pro…le, is highest. This is a problem with interdependent values. Agent i's conditional expected value for the object depends on the probability distribution on the states, conditional on the signals of all three agents. In McLean and Postlewaite (2004) , it is shown how one can design a mechanism to allocate the object to the highest value agent for problems of this sort. Consider a direct mechanism in which each agent reports his type (s i ; v i ): The mechanism uses the reported signals about the state, s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) to compute the posterior distribution ( ( 1 js); ( 2 js)) on . This posterior is used along with agent i's announced state dependent utilities to compute i's expected utility:
The mechanism then awards the object to the agent with the highest expected value v i (s) and that agent pays the second highest expected value. 1 The mechanism can be thought of as eliciting all the information available about the unknown state and then using a Vickrey auction based on the expected values that are computed using this information about . If agents always reported their true signals and if the true signal pro…le is s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ), then by the well known property of Vickrey auctions, it is a dominant strategy for each agent i to truthfully report his expected payo¤ v i (s). However, agents may indeed have an incentive to misreport their signals in order to manipulate the conditional expected valuations that are used to determine the winner and the price. For example, if all agents'have state dependent values that are lower in state 1 than in state 2 (x i < y i ; i = 1; 2; 3), then an agent who has received signal a 2 may have an incentive to report a 1 . Such a misreport will increase the probability weight that the posterior assigns to 1 : Consequently, this will lower all agents'expected values which, in turn, will a¤ect the price paid by the winner of the object.
To induce agents to truthfully announce their signals, McLean and Postlewaite add a reward z to the payment of agent i if his report about the state is in the majority. Since agents receive conditionally independent signals about the state, an agent maximizes the probability that he gets the reward z by announcing truthfully if other agents are doing so. Since the maximal possible gain from misreporting is bounded, then a su¢ ciently large z will make truthful announcement an equilibrium.
The reward z need not be very large if is close to 1. When is close to 1, it is very likely that the all agents received "correct" signals about the state. Therefore, conditional on his own signal, agent i believes that a lie will, with high probability, have only a small e¤ect on the posterior distribution on . But the expected gain from misreporting will be small if the expected change in the posterior is small. Thus, when agents are receiving very accurate signals about , small rewards will support truthful announcement as an equilibrium.
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate a two stage modi…cation of this kind of mechanism that accomplishes the same goal but requires less information to be transmitted. The two stages correspond to the two parts of the mechanism discussed above. The …rst stage elicits the information about the state and publicly posts the posterior distribution on given the reports. The agents use that posterior to compute their expected values of the object, and then report those expected values. As before, the object is sold to the agent with the highest reported expected value at the second highest reported expected value.
The important di¤erence between the one stage mechanism and the two stage mechanism is that, in the one stage mechanism, agent i reports his type -his signal s i and his vector of state dependent payo¤s (x i ; y i ) -while in the two stage mechanism he does not report his type. Instead he reports his signal s i and his expected utility given the posted posterior , a single number rather than a pair of numbers. In more general problems with m states of the world and k outcomes, an agent's type would include a m k matrix consisting of m state contingent payo¤s for each of the k outcomes.
The di¤erence in the dimensionality of these announcements is tied to where the expectation of utility given the posterior on is computed. In a one stage mechanism it must be done within the mechanism. To compute the expectation, the entire matrix of state-outcome payo¤s of each agent must be transmitted to the mechanism. In the two stage mechanism, only the information necessary to determine the posterior on given all available private information is transmitted in the …rst stage. The resulting posterior is then transmitted to the agents, who compute the expectations and return those expected values to the mechanism. In terms of the amount of information that must be transmitted, it is more e¢ cient for the agents to compute the expectations.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the structure and salient results from MP (2014). If K is a …nite set, let jKj denote the cardinality of K and let (K) denote the set of probability measures on K. Throughout the paper, jj jj 2 will denote the 2-norm and, for notational simplicity, jj jj will denote the 1-norm. The real vector spaces on which these norms are de…ned will be clear from the context. Let = f 1 ; ::; m g represent the …nite set of states of nature and let T i denote the …nite set of types of player i: Let ( T ) denote the set of P 2 ( T ) whose marginals on and T satisfy the following full support assumptions: P ( ) > 0 for each 2 and P (t) > 0 for each t 2 T: The conditional distribution induced by P on given t 2 T (resp., the conditional distribution induced by (the marginal of) P on T i given t i 2 T i ) is denoted P ( jt) (resp., P ( jt i )): Let C denote the …nite set of social alternatives. Agent i 0 s payo¤ is represented by a nonnegative valued function v i : C T i ! R + and we assume that for all i, v i ( ; ; ) M for some M 0:
A social choice problem is a collection (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) where P 2 ( T ): An outcome function is a mapping q : T ! C that speci…es an outcome in C for each pro…le of announced types. A mechanism is a collection (q; x 1 ; ::; x n ) (written simply as (q; (x i )) where q : T ! C is an outcome function and the functions x i : T ! R are transfer functions. For any pro…le of types t 2 T; letv
Althoughv depends on P , we suppress this dependence for notational simplicity as well. Finally, we make the simple but useful observation that the pure private value model is mathematically identical to a model in which j j = 1: De…nition 1: Let (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) be a social choice problem. A mechanism (q; (x i )) is: ex post incentive compatible if truthful revelation is an ex post Nash equilibrium: for all i 2 N , all t i ; t 0 i 2 T i and all t i 2 T i ;
interim incentive compatible if truthful revelation is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium: for each i 2 N and all t i ; t
for all i and all t 2 T:
outcome e¢ cient if for each t 2 T;
In our framework, ex post means ex post the realization of the agents'information pro…le. All activity takes place after players learn their private information but before the realization of is known. If, for all i,v i (c; t) does not depend on t i ; then the notions of ex post Nash equilibrium and dominant strategy equilibrium coincide.
The Model

Information Decompositions
In this section, we show how the information structure for general incomplete information problems, even those without a product structure, can be represented in a way that separates out an agent's information about the state : This is important because it is this part of his type that a¤ects other agents'valuations of the social alternatives. The example of Section 2 illustrates how we can elicit truthful reporting of agents'signals about the state when they are correlated.
In that example, an agent has beliefs about other agents signals that depend on his own signal, and it is important that the beliefs are di¤erent for di¤erent signals the agent may receive. In the example, agent i's type consists of a signal a i and a state dependent utility function that is independent of his signal. Consequently agent i has multiple types consisting of the same signal but di¤erent utility functions, and all of these types will necessarily have the same beliefs about other agents'signals.
It isn't necessary to elicit that part of an agent's type that doesn't a¤ect other agents' valuations (e.g., his utility function in the example) to cope with the interdependence, only the part related to the state . To formalize this idea, we recall the notion of information decomposition from McLean and Postlewaite (2004).
2
De…nition 2: Suppose that P 2 ( T ): An information decomposition for P is a collection D = ((A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) satisfying the following conditions: (i) For each i, A i is a …nite set and f i :
If t i 2 T i ; we will interpret f i (t i ) 2 A i as the "informationally relevant component" of t i and we will refer to A i as the set of agent i's "signals." Condition (ii) states that a type pro…le t 2 T; contains no information beyond that contained in the signal pro…le f (t) that is useful in predicting the state of nature. Condition (iii) states that a speci…c type t i 2 T i contains no information beyond that contained in the signal f i (t i ) that is useful in predicting the signals of other agents.
Every P 2 ( T ) has at least one information decomposition in which A i = T i ; f i = id; and Q = P which we will refer to as the trivial decomposition. However, the trivial decomposition may not be the only one (or the most useful one as we will show below). For example, suppose that each agent's type set has a product structure T i = X i Y i and that P 2 ( T ) satis…es P ( ; x 1 ; y 1 ; ::; x n ; y n ) = P 1 ( ; x 1 ; ::; x n )P 2 (y 1 ; ::; y n ) for each (x 1 ; y 1 ; ::; x n ; y n ) where P 1 2 ( X) and P 2 (Y ): Then de…ning the projection map p Xi (x i ; y i ) = x i ; it follows that D = ((X i ; p Xi ) i2N ; P 1 ) is an information decomposition for P .
Remark: If (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) is a social choice problem, then it follows from the de…nition that any two information decompositions
for P give rise to the samev i ; i.e., for all t 2 T; we have X
Informational Size
In this paper, a fundamental role is played by the notion of informational size. Suppose that
In a direct mechanism, agent i reports an element of T i to the mechanism. Consider an alternative scenario in which each agent i reports a signal a i 2 A i to the mechanism. If i reports a i and the remaining agents report a i ; it follows that the pro…le a = (a i ; a i ) 2 A will induce a conditional distribution on (computed from Q) and, if agent i's report changes from a i to a 0 i , then this conditional distribution will (in general) change. We consider agent i to be informationally small if, for each a i ; agent i ascribes "small" probability to the event that he can e¤ect a "large" change in the induced conditional distribution on by changing his announced type from a i to some other a 0 i . This is formalized in the following de…nition.
The informational size of agent i is de…ned as
Loosely speaking, we will say that agent i is informationally small with respect to Q if 
is the probability that i can have a "large"in ‡uence on the conditional distribution on by reporting a 0 i instead of a i conditional on his observed signal a i : An agent is informationally small if for each of his possible types a i , he assigns small probability to the event that he can have a "large" in ‡uence on the distribution Q ( ja i ; a i ); given his observed type. 4 
Variability of Beliefs
The example of Section 2 illustrates how one might induce truthful announcement of agents' signals about the state. An agent who receives the signal a 1 believes that the state is more likely to be 1 than 2 . Given that agents'signals are conditionally independent, he believes that each of the other agents is more likely to have received signal a 1 than a 2 . Hence, if those agents are announcing truthfully, he maximizes his chance of receiving the reward z by announcing truthfully as well. More generally, the key to constructing rewards for an agent who might receive signal a or a 0 is that the agent's beliefs about other agents' signals when he receives signal a di¤er from his beliefs when he receives signal a 0 . Moreover, the magnitude of the di¤erence matters in inducing truthful announcement. We turn next to de…ning a measure of the variation of an agent's beliefs.
Suppose that Q 2 ( A).We can …nd rewards that will induce agent i to reveal his information if Q( ja i ) and Q( ja To de…ne formally the measure of variability, we treat each conditional Q( ja i ) 2 (A i ) as a point in a Euclidean space of dimension equal to the cardinality of A i : Our measure of variability is de…ned as
If Q i > 0, then the agents' signals cannot be stochastically independent with respect to Q. We will exploit this correlation in constructing Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. For a discussion of the relationship between this notion of correlation and that found in the full extraction literature, see MP (2014).
It is important to point out that Q i and
When an agent's type set has a product structure T i = X i Y i as in the example of Section 4.1 and D = ((T i ; id) i2N ; P ) is the trivial decomposition, then Q i = P i = 0 for all i. However, for the decomposition D = ((X i ; p Xi ) i2N ; P 1 ) of that example, it may in fact be the case that P1 i > 0: The utility of decompositions will become apparent when we state Theorem B below.
The One Stage Implementation Game
The Generalized VCG Mechanism
We now adapt some of our previous results on implementation with interdependent values to the model of this paper. In the special case of pure private values, i.e., when j j = 1, it is well known that the classical VCG transfers will implement an outcome e¢ cient social choice function: in the induced direct revelation game, it is a dominant strategy to honestly report one's type. In the general case of interdependent values, the situation is more delicate.
Let q : T ! C be an outcome e¢ cient social choice function for the problem (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ). For each t; de…ne transfers as follows:
Note that q i (t) 0 for each i and t. The resulting mechanism (q; ( q i )) is the generalized VCG mechanism with interdependent valuations (GVCG for short) studied in MP(2014). It is straightforward to show that the GVCG mechanism is ex post individually rational and feasible.
In the pure private value case where j j = 1; it follows that for an outcome e¢ cient social choice function q : T ! C; we have q(t) 2 arg max
and the GVCG transfers reduce to
which are precisely the classical VCG transfers. Honest reporting of one's type is, of course, a dominant strategy in this private values setup. Unfortunately, the GVCG mechanism does not inherit the very attractive dominant strategy property of the pure private values special case.
It is tempting to conjecture that the GVCG mechanism satis…es ex post incentive compatibility or perhaps the weaker notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility but even the latter need not hold. There are, however, certain positive results. In MP (2014), it is shown that the GVCG mechanism is ex post incentive compatible when the problem satis…es a condition called nonexclusive information. This property is satis…ed by all pure private values models, in which case, ex post incentive compatibility reduces to dominant strategy incentive compatibility. This observation follows as an immediate consequence of the de…nition of GVCG mechanisms but it can also be deduced from a result that will play a crucial role in our analysis. This is the "gain-bounded" property of the GVCG mechanism proved in McLean and Postlewaite (2014).
Lemma A: Suppose that q : T ! C is outcome e¢ cient for the problem (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) and suppose that D = ((A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P: Then for all t i 2 T i and t i ; t
In the case of the GVCG mechanism, Lemma A provides an upper bound on the "ex post gain" to agent i when i's true type is t i but i announces t 0 i and others announce truthfully. An important implication of Lemma A is that an agent's gain by misreporting his type is essentially bounded by the degree to which his type a¤ects the posterior probability distribution on ; we return to this below. In the pure private values model where j j = 1; we conclude that
)jj = 0 and we recover the classic dominant strategy result. There is a second rami…cation of Lemma A: when agents are informationally small, honest reporting is an approximate ex post Nash equilibrium in the GVCG mechanism. See MP (2014) for a discussion of this result.
Lemma A has a third important consequence: if agent i is informationally small, then truth is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the GVCG mechanism so the mechanism is approximately interim incentive compatible. More precisely, we can deduce from Lemma A that the interim expected gain from misreporting one's type is essentially bounded from above by one's informational size. If we want the mechanism to be exactly interim incentive compatible, then we must alter the mechanism (speci…cally, construct an augmented GVCG mechanism) in order to provide the correct incentives for truthful behavior. We turn to this next.
A Direct Mechanism for the One Stage Implementation Game
If we use the GVCG mechanism to de…ne a direct revelation game, then we show in MP (2014) that honest reporting is an approximate ex post Nash equilibrium and an approximate BayesNash equilibrium when agents are informationally small. In MP (2014), we also consider a modi…cation of the GVCG mechanism that is both approximately ex post incentive compatible and exactly, rather than approximately, interim incentive compatible when agents are informationally small. To state the main result of MP (2014), we need the notion of an augmented mechanism.
De…nition 4: Let (z i ) i2N be an n-tuple of functions z i : T ! R + each of which assigns to each t 2 T a nonnegative number, interpreted as a "reward" to agent i. If (q; x 1 ; ::; x n ) is a mechanism, then the associated augmented mechanism is de…ned as (q; x 1 + z 1 ; ::; x n + z n ) and will be written simply as (q; (x i + z i )):
Using precisely the same techniques found in MP (2014), we can prove the following result for direct mechanisms. (ii) For every " > 0; there exists a > 0 such that the following holds: whenever q : T ! C is outcome e¢ cient for the problem (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) and whenever D = ((A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) satisfying
there exists an augmented GVCG mechanism (q; ( q i + z i )) with 0 z i (t) " for every i and t satisfying ex post IR and interim IC. 5 Part (i) of Theorem 2 states that, as long as Q( ja i ) 6 = Q( ja 0 i ) whenever a i 6 = a 0 i ; then irrespective of the agents'informational sizes, the augmenting transfers can be chosen so that the augmented mechanism satis…es Bayesian incentive compatibility. However, the required augmenting transfers will be large if the agents have large informational size. Part (ii) states that the augmenting transfers will be small if the agents have informational size that is small enough relative to our measure of variation in the agents'beliefs.
To understand this condition, we …rst note that, if agent i is informationally small, then truth is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the GVCG mechanism so the mechanism is approximately interim incentive compatible. More precisely, we can deduce from Lemma A that the interim expected gain from misreporting one's type is essentially bounded from above by one's informational size. If we want the mechanism to be exactly interim incentive compatible, then we must alter the mechanism (speci…cally, construct an augmented GVCG mechanism) in order to provide the correct incentives for truthful behavior. In MP (2014), the augmenting z i rewards are de…ned using a spherical scoring rule and the di¤erence in an agent's expected reward between honest reporting and lying is (essentially) bounded from below by As we have mentioned previously, the agents' beliefs cannot be independent if Q i > 0 for each i. Correlated information also plays a signi…cant role in the full surplus extraction problem in the mechanism design literature (see McLean (1985, 1989) .) Those papers (and subsequent work by McAfee and Reny (1992)) demonstrated how one can use correlation to fully extract the surplus in certain mechanism design problems. The problems, however, are quite di¤erent. Surplus extraction is a mechanism design problem while our problem is an implementation problem. We do not look for transfers and an allocation scheme that solves a mechanism design problem of the type presented in, for example, Myerson (1981) or McLean (1985, 1988) . Instead, we study the problem of implementation of a given e¢ cient social choice function and it is important to explicate the di¤erences. See MP (2014) for a discussion of this issue.
An Indirect Mechanism for the One Stage Implementation Problem
The direct revelation game is the most common formulation of the implementation problem and is, in a well known sense, without loss of generality as a result of the revelation principle. However, there are interesting "indirect"mechanisms in which the message space M i of agent i is di¤erent from T i : Suppose that (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) is a problem and suppose that D = ((A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P: Let G i denote the collection of all functions g i : C ! R + . Consequently we identify G i with R C + : Suppose that i's message space is M i = A i G i : Let Z = ( i ) i2N be an n-tuple of functions i : A ! R + each of which assigns to each a 2 A a nonnegative number i (a) interpreted as a "reward"to agent i. If the agents report the pro…le (a; g) 2 A G;then the mediator chooses a social outcome
and augmented transfers This indirect mechanism induces a game of incomplete information. A strategy for agent i in this game is a pair ( i ; i ) where i : T i ! A i speci…es a type dependent report i (t i ) 2 A i and
is a truthful Bayes-Nash equilibrium in this one stage game, then the revelation principle ensures that the outcome of the game coincides with an outcome of the revelation game of Section 5.2. Under the hypotheses of (i) or (ii) of Theorem A, one can construct a system of augmenting transfers i ensuring that a truthful Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists in this game of incomplete information.
The Two Stage Implementation Game
Preliminaries
Suppose that (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) is a social choice problem and suppose that D = ((A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P:
Throughout this section, we will use the following notational convention:
Let H i denote the collection of all functions u i : C ! R + . Consequently we identify H i with R C + : For each pro…le u = (u 1 ; ::; u n ) 2 H := H 1 H n ; let
and de…neŷ
Therefore, (';ŷ 1 ; ::;ŷ n ) de…nes the classic private values VCG mechanism and it follows that u i 2 arg max
We wish to formulate our implementation problem with interdependent valuations as a two stage problem in which honest reporting of the agents'signals in stage one resolves the "interdependency" problem so that the stage two problem is a simple implementation problem with private values to which the classic VCG mechanism can be immediately applied. We now de…ne an extensive form game that formalizes the two stage process that lies behind this idea. As in the indirect mechanism for the one stage problem, let Z = ( i ) i2N be an n-tuple of functions i : A ! R + each of which assigns to each a 2 A a nonnegative number i (a) again interpreted as a "reward" to agent i. These rewards are designed to induce agents to honestly report their signals in stage 1.
Given an information decomposition D and a reward system Z; we de…ne an extensive form game (D; Z) that unfolds in the following way.
Stage 1:
Each agent i learns his type t i 2 T i and makes a (not necessarily honest) report r i 2 A i of his signal to the mechanism designer. If (r 1 ; ::; r n ) is the pro…le of stage 1 reports, then agent i receives the nonnegative payment i (r 1 ; ::; r n ) and the game moves to stage 2.
Stage 2: If (r 1 ; ::; r n ) = r 2 A is the reported type pro…le in stage 1, the mechanism designer publicly posts the conditional distribution (r) = Q ( jr). Agents observe this posted distribution (but not the pro…le r) and make a second (not necessarily honest) report from H i to the mechanism designer. If (u 1 ; ::; u n ) = u 2 H is the second stage pro…le of reports, then the mechanism designer chooses the social alternative '(u) 2 C; each agent i receives the transfer y i (u); and the game ends.
We wish to design the rewards i so as to accomplish two goals. In stage 1, we want to induce agents to report honestly so that the reported stage 1 pro…le is exactly f (t) = (f 1 (t 1 ); ::; f n (t n )) when the true type pro…le is t. In stage 2, upon observing the posted posterior distribution Q ( jf (t)); we want each agent i to report the payo¤ function
If these twin goals are accomplished in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then the social outcome is
the transfers arê
and the ex post payo¤ to agent i of type
Note that these transfers and payo¤s are precisely the GVCG transfers and payo¤s de…ned in Section 5 for the one stage implementation problem.
Strategies and Equilibria in the Two Stage Game
De…ne := fQ ( ja) : a 2 Ag:
Given the speci…cation of the extensive form, it follows that the second stage information sets of agent i are indexed by the elements of A i T i : A strategy for agent i in this game is a pair ( i ;
Formally, a system of beliefs for player i is a collection of probability measures on T i indexed by A i T i ; i.e., a collection of the form
with the following interpretation: when player i of type t i reports r i in Stage 1 and observes the posted distribution ; then player i assigns probability mass i ( ; t i jr i ; ; t i ) to the event that other players have true types t i and that the state of nature is : As usual, an assessment is a pair f( i ; i ) i2N ; ( i ) i2N g consisting of a strategy pro…le and a system of beliefs for each player.
Bayesian Equilibrium assessment and the pro…le ( i ; i ) i2N is truthful.
The Main Result
Theorem B: Let (v 1 ; ::; v n ) be a collection of payo¤ functions.
(a) Suppose that q : T ! C is outcome e¢ cient for the problem (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ): Suppose that D = (A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P satisfying Q i > 0 for each i. Then there exists a reward system Z = ( i ) i2N such that the two stage game (D; Z) has an ICPBE ( ; ; ).
(b) For every " > 0; there exists a > 0 such that the following holds: whenever q : T ! C is outcome e¢ cient for the problem (v 1 ; ::; v n ; P ) and D = (A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P satisfying max
there exists a reward system Z = ( i ) i2N such that the two stage game (D; Z) has an ICPBE ( ; ; ). Furthermore, 0 i (a) " for every i and a.
To prove Theorem B, we proceed in several steps which we outline here. Suppose that D = (A i ; f i ) i2N ; Q) is an information decomposition for P .
Step 1 : Suppose that ( ; ) is a strategy pro…le with i (t i ) = f i (t i ) for all i and t i : Suppose that player i is of true type t i ; the other players have true type pro…le t i ; player i reports r i in stage 1. Given the de…nition of ( i ; i ); it follows that j (t j ) = f j (t j ) for each j 6 = i: Therefore, player i of type t i who has submitted report r i in stage 1 and who observes 2 at stage 2 will assign positive probability X
Therefore, i's updated beliefs regarding ( ; t i ) consistent with ( ; ) are given by
Step 2 : Let w i ( ; ; t i ) := X 2 v i ( ; ; t i ) ( ) and for each and t i let w i ( ; t i ) 2 H i be de…ned as
Next, we de…ne the following particular second stage component i of agent i's strategy as follows: for each (r i ; ;
where i ( jr i ; ; t i ) is de…ned in Step 1 7 . We then show that
Step 3 : If i (t i ) = f i (t i ) for all i and t i and i is de…ned as in Step 2, then ( ; ) is a truthful strategy pro…le. The proof is completed by constructing a system of rewards Z = ( i ) i2N such that ( ; ; ) is an ICPBE of the two stage game (D; Z). To accomplish this, we de…ne
To prove part (a) of Theorem B, we show that one can …nd " > 0 so that (i) deviations at second stage information sets are unpro…table given the beliefs de…ned in step 1 and (ii) coordinated deviations across the two stages are unpro…table. This latter argument depends crucially on the special transfers i : It is these transfers that induce truthful reporting in stage 1, thus reducing the second stage to a simple implementation problem with private values. To prove part (b), we show that " can be chosen to be small when each agent's informational size is small enough relative to the variation in his beliefs.
7. Discussion
Information Transmitted
We have presented three approaches to implementation with interdependent values: a one stage direct mechanism, a one stage indirect mechanism and a two stage game. In each of these approaches, the "quantity" and "complexity" of the information that is transmitted by the agents to the mechanism is di¤erent. Because of the revelation principle, it is commonplace to conduct analyses using direct mechanisms. However, a direct mechanism may not be the agents' preferred mechanism when, e.g., privacy is a consideration. In our one stage direct mechanism, an agent reports his type. In the one stage indirect mechanism, he reports signal and a payo¤ as a function of the social outcome and the state. At the end of the two stage game, he has reported a signal and a payo¤ as a function only of the social outcome. For many problems agents would like to send as little information as possible. They may be concerned that the information may be misused by the mechanism designer, or they might be concerned that others may learn something about the agent because of the information transmitted. The mechanism itself may reveal, at least partially, the information an agent sends; alternatively, the agent may be concerned that reported information may be inadvertently leaked.
Our three mechanisms provide a hierarchy of implementation games in terms of privacy protection and we can use the product structure example of Section 4.3 to illustrate this hierarchy. In an equilibrium of the one stage direct mechanism, agent i reveals his true type t i = (x i ; y i ) and the mechanism learns both coordinates. In an equilibrium of the one stage indirect mechanism, agent i reveals his true signal x i and his true payo¤ function g i = v i ( ; ; t i ) but not his true y i : Although the mechanism learns i's true value of x i ; the mechanism can only make an inference regarding the second coordinate y i of agent i's type using the information contained in the pair (x i ; g i ):
In an equilibrium of the two stage game, agent i reveals his true x i and his true expected payo¤ function
Again, the mechanism learns i's true value of x i and again, the mechanism can only make an inference regarding the second coordinate y i of agent i's type. However, the information with respect to which this inference is made, i.e., (x i ; u i ) is coarser that the information available in the one stage indirect mechanism. Furthermore, while mechanism design typically focuses on the incentive problems of eliciting information, there is ultimately a cost of running these mechanisms. One of the costs of operating a mechanism is related to the complexity of the information that agents must transmit to the mechanism. 8 Agents transmit less information in our two stage mechanism than they transmit in the one stage indirect mechanism described above. In the one stage indirect mechanism agents need to transmit their entire state dependent utility function for the mechanism to compute agents'expected utility functions on C. In the two stage mechanism, they need only transmit the expected utility function, a vector, a substantial savings in message size, particularly when there are many states.
Informational Requirements
In mechanism design theory, it is commonly assumed that the data de…ning the problem is common knowledge, that is, that the utility functions and probability distributions are commonly known by the mechanism designer and the agents who are to participate in the mechanism. This is a heroic assumption in nearly all problems and there is always a desire to decrease the reliance of mechanisms on the common knowledge assumption. Dominant strategy mechanisms, when possible, are attractive for this reason. Similarly mechanisms for which truthful announcement is an ex post Nash equilibrium are valued. We note that in our two stage mechanism, the …rst stage announcements are approximately ex post Nash equilibria in the sense de…ned in MP (2014) when agents are informationally small.
There are interesting problems that are covered by our model for which the usual common knowledge assumption can be relaxed. Speci…cally, for the case of noisy signals about two states, it is enough that the agents and the mechanism designer know the maximum and minimum values of the accuracy parameter , the agents know their payo¤s and and the mechanism designer knows the maximum and minimum values of the possible payo¤s. With this information, the mechanism can compute augmenting transfers that reward an agent whose report is a majority report as in the example of Section 2. Furthermore, these transfers can be chosen to induce honest reporting for any distribution generated by accuracy levels in the given range. Consequently, the agents will report honestly in stage 1 irrespective of their beliefs regarding the true value of the accuracy knowing only the range of possible values. Once the informationally relevant information is revealed in stage 1, it is a dominant strategy to truthfully report expected payo¤ functions in stage 2. Then for each t 2 T and all ;
where the last inequality follows from Lemma B.
where
; :
Lemma E: Suppose that Q 2 ( A) and de…ne a system of rewards Z = ( i ) i2N where 
Proof of Theorem B
We will prove part (b) of Theorem B …rst. To begin, de…ne beliefs i ( jr i ; ; t i ) 2 ( T i ) for agent i at each information set (r i ; ; t i ) 2 A i T i as in Section 5. In addition, de…ne w i ( ; ; t i ) and w i ( ; t i ) as in Section 5. Let i (t i ) = f i (t i ) and recall that i is de…ned for agent i as follows: for each (r i ; ; t i ) 2 A i T i ; let i (r i ; ; t i ) 2 arg max
[v i ('(u i ; w i ( ; t i )); ; t i )+ŷ i (u i ; w i ( ; t i ))] i ( ; t i jr i ; ; t i ):
Choose " > 0 and de…ne a system of rewards Z = ( i ) i2N where i (a i ; a i ) = " Q(a i ja i ) jjQ( ja i )jj 2 :
Since 0 Q(a ijai) jjQ( jai)jj2
1; for all i, a i and a i :it follows that 0 i (a i ; a i ) ":
Next suppose that 0 < < "
We will show that ( ; ; ) is an ICPBE in the game (D; Z) whenever max i [v i ('(w i ( ; ; t i ); w i ( ; t i )); ; t i ) +ŷ i (w i ( ; ; t i ); w i ( ; t i )] i ( ; t i jr i ; ; t i ):
Therefore, ( ; ) is truthful.
Part 2 : To show that deviations at second stage information sets are unpro…table, suppose that all players use i in stage 1 and players j 6 = i use j in stage 2. Then, upon observing and having reported truthfully in stage 1, it follows from the de…nition of j that each player j 6 = i reports j (f j (t j ); ; t j ) = w j ( ; ; t j ) in stage 2. Therefore, the second stage expected payo¤ to player i who reports u i 2 H i given the beliefs i de…ned above is X Part 3 : To show that coordinated deviations across stages are unpro…table for player i, we assume that other players use ( i ; i ) and we must show that, for all t i 2 T i and all r i 2 A i , we have for all u i 2 H i ; it follows from Lemma C that for each t i and each u i ; r i and t i ; X
